Classical models of product market competition maintain that firms maximize their profits regardless of their financial condition. Yet over the last two decades a growing theoretical literature has examined whether a firm's capital structure impacts competition in the market for the firm's products. In this paper we ask whether a firm operating under bankruptcy protection significantly reshapes competition for the firm's product in markets where the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt firms are in direct competition, using evidence from the US airline industry. The first part of the paper shows that (1) the median price in markets where a bankrupt carrier operates significantly drops; (2) competitors of a bankrupt firm differ in the way they react to the bankruptcy. In the second part of the paper, we estimate a structural model of demand for air travel and a model of airline pricing behavior. The results show that (1) shifts in the pricing equations of the bankrupt firm and of its competitors explain the observed price changes; (2) there is no evidence that consumers substitute away from a bankrupt airline to its competitors. Finally, we present a counter-factual experiment, to study how prices and consumer welfare would have changed if bankrupt firms had to liquidate their assets and exit the industry, without the possibility of operating under Chapter11 protection. We show that consumers did not benefit significantly from the availability of Chapter 11 to United or USAir; but that consumers benefited substantially from the availability of Chapter 11 to ATA.
Introduction
Classical models of product market competition maintain that firms maximize their profits regardless of their financial condition. Yet over the last two decades a growing theoretical literature has examined whether a firm's capital structure impacts competition in the market for the firm's products. 1 This body of work deals primarily with the interaction between product market competition and financial distress. Very few theoretical and empirical papers examine whether a real linkage exists between product market competition and bankruptcy. In this paper we ask whether a firm operating under bankruptcy protection significantly reshapes competition for the firm's product in markets where the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt firms are in direct competition. We investigate the demand and supply shocks spurring from a bankruptcy filing as the main channels through which bankruptcy impacts product market competition. 2 We examine the effects of bankruptcy on product market competition by studying the airline industry in the United States. This industry provides an interesting empirical framework for several reasons. First, it is an industry of strategic importance in the United States. Second, the airlines seeking bankruptcy protection form a heterogeneous group, including low cost carriers such as ATA, and national carriers such as United and USAir. The range of variation in the identities of the bankrupt airlines ensures that our empirical analysis provides insights on other industries as well. Third, because it is one industry where carriers interact over many distinct markets and over time, we can identify the effects of bankruptcy on product market competition, independent of potentially confounding market, firm, and time effects. Finally, because there are bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers serving the same market, we can investigate different carriers' price reactions to one carrier's bankruptcy.
We collected data from the Air Transportation Association website, the Bankruptcy Database prepared by Lynn LoPucki, and Factiva and Lexis-Nexis reports to compile an original dataset on the identity of carriers filing for bankruptcy protection, the time window during which these carreirs operated under court protection, and whether the carrier emerged from bankruptcy or liquidated under Chapter 7. We merge this novel dataset with data from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), covering the period from 1993 to 2006.
We organized our empirical analysis in three parts. The first part uses reduced form regressions 1 This literature focuses on how financial distress impacts the competitive interaction of distressed and nondistressed firms in an industry (Brander and Lewis (1986) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Hendel (1996) , Dasgupta and Titman (1998) ). Several empirical papers followed providing evidence of the interaction between financial distress and product market competition (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Scharfstein (1995, 1996) , Chevalier (1995a Chevalier ( , 1995b , Phillips (1995) , Campello (2006) , and Kovenock and Phillips (1995) . 2 Another important feature of a bankruptcy filing is the shift of control from equity to debt holders. We do not incorporate such a change in our model, as we assume that the objective of the firm is to maximize profits, regardless of the ownership structure. To facilitate this assumption, we drop observations from a few quarters before the bankruptcy filing, when to-be-bankrupt firms might try to maximize revenues to generate cash. along the lines of Borenstein and Rose (BR, 1995) , who were the first, to our knowledge, to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between bankruptcy filings and product market competition.
BR used data from the airline industry between 1989 and 1993 to study price changes around the bankruptcies of Eastern, Continental, America West and TWA. 3 BR found no systematic evidence that bankrupt firms changed their prices after filing for Chapter 11. They also did not find any evidence that the bankrupt firms' competitors changed their prices after the filings. Similarly, Busse (2002) found that carriers operating under bankruptcy protection are neither more nor less likely to start a price war. Using a different time period, and estimating regressions that control for unobserved market, carrier, and time characteristics, we find quite different results.
First, we find that the median prices in markets where a bankrupt carrier is operating significantly drops across competitors and markets. For instance, in response to the second US Airways Chapter 11 filing, the price dropped by 8 percent. 4 Next, we tease apart the effects on the prices of a bankrupt carrier's competitors, classifying them in four groups: low cost carriers, large national carriers, and Southwest Airlines. We show that the bankrupt carrier and the large national carriers react in the same direction, lowering their prices. Low cost carriers do not systematically and significantly react to their competitor's bankruptcy. Southwest, though, behaves in a peculiar way, sometimes raising (lowering) prices while the bankrupt and large national carriers drop (increase) prices.
The second part of our study uses a structural model to estimate the demand and cost functions of airline firms before and after a bankruptcy filing. We follow Morrison and Winston (1989) , [forthcoming], and Ciliberto and Williams (2007) and assume a nested logit model of demand for air travel. We jointly estimate it with the pricing equation of the airlines. Our main focus here is on the effect of bankruptcy filings on the demand and cost of airline service.
We do not find evidence that consumers substitute away from a bankrupt airline to its competitors. 5 Indeed, we show that the price changes documented by the reduced form regressions can be explained by shifts in the pricing equations of the bankrupt firm and of its competitors.
For the bankrupt firm, we claim that the lower costs associated with operating under bankruptcy protection can explain the shifts in their pricing equations. While operating under bankruptcy protection, firms can take cost-reducing actions that would be hard, or outright illegal, to implement outside of bankruptcy. For instance, firms can renege on their debt payments, reject leases, 3 BR use an ordinary least square regression to estimate the effect of bankruptcy on prices. The unit of observation is a carrier-route-quarter-year, as in our study. 4 To understand the economic significance of these price changes, consider the following. In a recent article on the Wall Street Journal, the Chief Executive Officer of America West stated that a 10 percent boost in revenues would have turned a 100 millions loss in a 150 million profit in 2004. 5 We do find some evidence that consumers are less willing to fly at all when a firm files for bankruptcy protection.
lay-off employees, reduce wages, and suspend pension contribution payments. This leeway, only granted while in bankruptcy protection, can significantly reduce the bankrupt carrier's costs. We do not find evidence that bankruptcy filing spawns real shocks to the demand of the bankrupt firm,
suggesting that firms operating under bankruptcy protection do not face a significant reputation cost. 6 Finally, for the competitors of the bankrupt firm, shifts in the pricing equation shifts are not as straightforward to interpret, and is best left to future work to determine their causes.
The third, and final, part of our analysis presents a counter-factual experiment, where we study how prices and consumer welfare would have changed if firms that chose Chapter 11 reorganization had instead had to liquidate under Chapter 7. In practice, our exercise consists of excluding a bankrupt firm (e.g. United) from the markets in which it operates, and recompute the equilibrium prices, shares, and consumer welfare that would have resulted without that firm.
Before we summarize the results of our counter-factual analysis, we want to state up front two important caveats. If firms could file for only Chapter 7, then more banks might be willing to rescue a firm, forestalling any bankruptcy filing. Yet, in deciding whether to do so, it is likely that banks would want to know the counterfactual we examine. The second caveat is that in the long run, we expect entry in the markets from which the bankrupt firm exited. We do not model this long run market equilibrium because integrating an entry model is beyond the scope of this paper. This caveat would be important if we found evidence that Chapter 11 is strongly and systematically beneficial to consumers. Instead, we find strong but circumscribed evidence on the benefits of Chapter 11 to consumers.
Our counter-factual experiment shows that consumers did not benefit significantly from the availability of Chapter 11 to United or USAir: aggregate consumer welfare would have dropped by only few thousands dollars if United and USAir had to file for Chapter 7. On the contrary, we find that consumers benefited substantially from the availability of Chapter 11 to ATA, a low cost carrier: in markets served by ATA, consumer welfare would drop by tens of thousands of dollars if firms could only file for Chapter 7. This result is explained by lower average prices, and the different values of the elasticities of demand in the markets where ATA is in and in the other markets. In light of the two caveats discussed above, our results suggest that Chapter 11 is beneficial to consumers only to the extent that it keeps low cost carriers in the industry, at least in the short run.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section (2) describes bankruptcies in the airline industry. In Section (3) we describe the model. Section (4) describes the data. Section (5) specifies the reduced form and structural econometric model. Section (6) deals with the identification issues that arise in the estimation. The reduced form results are presented in Section 6 See Rose (1990), Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988) , and Opler and Titman (1994).
(7), and the structural form results in Section (8) . In Section (9) we ask whether consumer benefit from the possibility firms have to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 protection, as opposed to being forced into liquidation under Chapter 7. Finally, Section (10) summarizes our results and provides concluding remarks.
2 Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry
The Legal Setting
The United States Bankruptcy Code contemplates two alternative solutions for firms in financial distress filing for Court protection: filing under Chapter 7 or under Chapter 11.
Chapter 7, entitled Liquidation, allows for an orderly, court-supervised procedure by which a trustee collects the assets of the firm, reduces them to cash, and makes distributions to creditors, subject to the debtor's right to retain certain exempt property and the rights of secured creditors.
Firms desiring to continue operations, and which have the ability to repay creditors concurrently through a court-approved plan of reorganization, file for Court protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, entitled Reorganization. 7 The reorganization plan must provide creditors with a disclosure statement containing information adequate to enable creditors to evaluate the plan.
The court ultimately approves or disapproves the reorganization plan. Under the confirmed plan, the debtor can reduce its debts by repaying a portion of its obligations and discharging others.
The debtor can also terminate burdensome contracts and leases, recover assets, and re-scale its operations in order to return to profitability. 8 Under Chapter 11, the debtor reorganizes its business plan, seeking alternative ways to run the business and to emerge from bankruptcy as a profitable enterprise. As the firm restructures its business, it faces supply and demand shocks inherent to operating under bankruptcy protection.
These shocks can change the competitive interaction of firms in the industry. In the empirical analysis these shocks are captured by bankruptcy categorical variables. This is because the available accounting data on costs report exactly those liabilities which are renegotiated under bankruptcy 7 The automatic stay protects the debtor by suspending collection activities, foreclosures, and repossessions of property by the creditors on any debt that arose before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
8 Two important Sections of Chapter 11 give airlines filing for bankruptcy protection a greater ability to renegotiate contracts with employees and with aircraft lessors: Sections 1113 and 1110. Under Section 1113, the airline can unilaterally modify labor agreements if negotiations turn out to be unsuccessful. For instance, if the carrier's unions do not agree to any labor renegotiation, the carrier can request that the bankruptcy Judge impose new contracts and force the unions to accept them. Clearly, the threat that the bankruptcy carrier can resort to Section 1113 gives the carrier an upper hand in the negotiations, allowing the airline to achieve reductions in the labor costs. Under Section 1110, a carrier that has defaulted on its aircraft lease payments has a 60 day grace period to find funds to make lease payments and keep the aircraft. Past the 60 day grace period, if the carrier has not paid its outstanding lease charges, the lessor can re-possess the aircraft. Rarely have lessors reposed their aircraft. In most occasions, the carrier finds some financing. If no financing is available, carriers either renegotiate lower lease payments, and if this fails, the airlines return the aircraft before repossession is forced. Repossessions have occurred for smaller carriers such as MarkAir (2 nd ), Western Pacific, and Sun Country Airlines.
and hence do not reveal exogenous cost shocks. Demand shocks, such as changes in the reputation of a firm, are not observable. Before discussing the nature of the demand and cost shocks associated with a bankruptcy filing, we summarize the information that we use to construct the bankruptcy categorical variables.
Stylized Facts of Airline Bankruptcies
We first identified airlines that have filed for bankruptcy protection between 1993 and 2005 from the Air Transportation Association (ATA) website 9 . This website provides a list of the names of air carriers that have filed for bankruptcy protection, the date of the bankruptcy filing, and the type of protection the airline requested (reorganization under Chapter 11 or liquidation under Chapter 7). We cross check this data with the Bankruptcy Research Database compiled by Professor Lynn
LoPucki. 10 We enrich this data with information from news reports recorded in Factiva and Lexis-Nexus.
For each of the airlines that filed for bankruptcy protection between 1993 and 2005, we manually search Factiva and Lexis-Nexus for any news report dating back to about one year prior, and two years after, the firm's bankruptcy filing. This allows us to include items such as: Whether the filing is voluntary or not, whether the airline originally filed for Chapter 11 protection but was forced to convert its filing to Chapter 7, whether the carrier emerged from bankruptcy or not, the date of emergence or liquidation, the way the carrier emerged (e.g., reorganizing on its own or merging with another carrier), if the carrier was gounded and if so, we record the date it stopped flying and if this was a voluntary decision or a requirement by the FAA based on safety concerns.
These news searches revealed stylized facts of bankruptcy in the airline industry. Table 1 summarizes our main findings.
Columns 3 and 4 show that almost all airlines first file for Chapter 11 protection. Large airlines immediately begin developing a reorganization plan. Smaller carriers first attempt to keep the business alive seeking an investor who would buy the carrier's flying certificate and any other assets the carrier might still posses. If the carrier's management is unsuccessful at finding such investor(s) the carrier converts its Chapter 11 filing into a Chapter 7 one. For instance, in the case of MarkAir's second filing the U.S. Bankruptcy Court involved in the proceedings, changed 9 The data is complied from ATA research, DOT records, "The Bankruptcy Virus in the U.S. Airline Industry: Causes and Cures," Aviation Forecasting and Economics and The George Washington University, Lehman Brothers Equity Research, BankruptcyData.com, Chicago Tribune. 10 This database includes all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that satisfy the following two requirements. First, the debtor group filing for Chapter 11 protection must have assets worth at least $100 million at the time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and as listed on the last 10-k filed prior to bankruptcy (provided that 10k is for a year ending within three years prior to bankruptcy). Second, the debtor group is required to file 10-ks with the SEC. For the airlines satisfying these requirements, we double check the filing dates, the type of filing, and the date of emergence where available.
MarkAir's Chapter 11 protection filing to a Chapter 7 liquidation after the carrier spent about 8 months under Chapter 11 protection; this allowed the closed airline to start selling its assets to pay off creditors.
Column 5 shows that in the only two cases of the Sun Country and Eastwind when airlines had to file for protection under Chapter 7, the filing was initiated by the carrier's creditors who take the airline to Court -making this an involuntary filing. 11 Column 6 shows that there are airlines that filed multiple times for Chapter 11 protection.
Columns 7 to 11 show that the probability that airlines emerge as an independent entity declines with the number of filings in the past and with the shorter time span between filings. For example, USAir emerged in 2005 after merging with America West, and TWA emerged in 2001 after being acquired by American. We should then expect the competitive behavior to change differently when carriers file for the first time, or for subsequent times. This, indeed, is what we find in our empirical analysis.
Finally, Column 12 show that there is large variation in the duration of bankruptcy protection in the airline industry. There does not seem to be any clear relationship between the duration and the probability of emergence from bankruptcy.
Supply Shocks
Bankruptcy protection allows the distressed carrier to implement cost-saving actions that would be illegal outside of court protection. For airline carriers some of the most important cost-saving strategies involve lease rejection and renegotiation, pension payments renegotiations or rejections, forcing labor union concessions.
Leases. Under Section 1110 of Chapter 11, a bankrupt carrier that has defaulted on its aircraft lease payments is granted a 60 day grace period to find funds to make lease payments and keep the aircraft. Past the 60 day grace period, if the carrier has not paid its outstanding lease charges, the lessor can re-possess the aircraft. Rarely though, have lessors repossessed their aircraft. 12 Most lessors are willing to renegotiate payments with the bankrupt carrier, because the lessor who takes back a plane would have to redeploy the plane elsewhere, and in an industry in distress, that might be more costly than, for example, extending payment schedules, or renegotiating payment terms.
Further, since rescinded leases become a general unsecured claim on the carrier, the carrier has a strong bargaining position with their lessor. 13 In rare instances, the lessor takes the carrier to 11 For Sun Country Airlines, it took the the carriers lessors' to file for involuntary liquidation. In few occasions the FAA grounds the airline for safety concerns, or for training and maintenance violations, as in the case of Kiwi Airlines, MarkAir, and ProAir. Unless the airline is already under Court protection, the FAA grounding precipitates the carrier's bankruptcy filing. 12 Repossessions have occurred for small carriers such as MarkAir (second bankruptcy), Western Pacific, and Sun Country Airlines. 13 Reneging on pension obligations, or renegotiating with employees and retirees on pension payments, can substantially lower the carrier's operating cost.
Labor Renegotiations. The airline industry is heavily burdened by labor union contracts. Renegotiations with labor unions and employees is one of the most important cost-saving strategies airlines operating under bankruptcy protection take. The threat that the carrier can be forced into liquidation, leaving employees jobless, makes labor unions and employees more willing to renegotiate than they would otherwise be. Furthermore, Chapter 11 status gives companies the ability to void labor contracts with a judge's approval. 17 
Demand Shocks
There are reputation costs associated with a bankruptcy filing, that might affect the demand for a bankrupt carrier's flights. For example, Opler and Titman (1994) show that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors during industry downturns. More specific to the airline industry, Rose (1990) shows that airline profitability is or forgive lease payments on 98 planes in Continental's fleet. America West negotiated rent relief on the planes it leased with lessor Ansett Worldwide Aviation Services. ATA returned 18 planes to lessor General Electric. Delta Airlines requested, as part of its bankruptcy filing, court approval to reject leases on Delta aircrafts. 14 Lessors of US Air were considering filing a lawsuit against the carrier, but Brad Gupta, the president of Chicagobased Ameriquest Holdings which leases aircrafts to US Airways, publicly recognized in a statement on July 25, 2002 that such an action would leave the lessor facing other problems: lower lease rates and lower demand for rejected leases thus discouraging the lessor's lawsuit. 15 Delta has rejected or restructured dozens of leases at airports, including Tampa, Dallas and Orlando 16 For instance, under United Airline's reorganization plan, the PBGC took over all four of the airline's underfunded pension plans. Immediately after filing for Chapter 11, Delta Airlines sought permission to cut off payments to a bulk of the retirement annuities received by thousands of former employees, in order to save $80 million a year. Northwest Airlines, which filed on the same day as Delta airlines, sought similar protection from the PBGC. 17 For instance, David Siegel, CEO of US Airways, took the carrier into Chapter 11 when the airline's mechanics wouldn't join other unions in making voluntary sacrifices. Once in Chapter 11, the ability to void labor contracts with a judge's approval, helped Siegel win concessions from the mechanics labor union. Another clear example is United Airlines, which filed a motion in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Chicago to start the process of voiding the unions' labor contracts and imposing new terms that would significantly cut the carrier's expenses, on December 30, 2002 just 20 days after its Chapter 11 filing.
directly correlated with airline safety. Bankrupt carriers tend not to be profitable, thus the safety of flying a bankrupt carrier is questionable. It is possible that consumers who recognize this might shift their demand away from the bankrupt carrier to the non-bankrupt carriers. 18 Safety consideration aside, passengers might still prefer to fly non-bankrupt carriers. Customers fear that a bankrupt carrier might not emerge from bankruptcy protection and therefore any miles accumulated in the carrier's frequent flier program would be lost. Furthermore, passengers have shown concern that, even if the carrier emerges from bankruptcy, frequent flier miles might not be honored by the emerging carrier. 19 This would drive demand away from the distressed carrier to its non-distressed competitor.
The Model
We consider a model with two firms, j = 1, 2. The firms' strategic variables are prices, and the firms produce differentiated goods. The equilibrium notion that we use to solve the game played by the two firms is the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices. For each one of the two firms, we can draw its reaction function. The reaction functions of the two firms are graphically presented in Figure 1 shows two graphs, each presenting comparative statics on the reaction functions of the two airline firms. 21 We start from a situation where the two airline firms choose equilibrium prices
This is the pre-bankruptcy situation. Then, we consider what happens when firm j files for bankruptcy protection. Figure 1a considers the case where j's bankruptcy filing impacts only its costs. The nature of the cost shocks, described in Section (2.3), suggests that we should expect firm j to be able to lower its costs. This shifts j's reaction curve to the left: for any price of its competitor, p −j , firm j is now going to choose a lower price. As a result, firm j will lower its prices, and its competitor will also lower p −j . The new equilibrium is at
where both firms charge lower prices for 18 Yet, the evidence of Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988) might suggest the opposite. The authors investigate the impact of accidents on demand for an airline's services. They find virtually no effect of safety on demand for an airline's services (following a crash, the demand effects on the airline that crashed are small and short term-lived). The authors also find very small effects on the demand on the competitors of the carrier that experienced an accident. This indicates that that passengers who chose not to fly a carrier following an accident, decline to fly any airline. For our purpose, this suggests that safety concerns following bankruptcy might have little effects on the demand of the bankrupt and non-bankrupt carrier. 19 For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal on December 11, 2002 , shows United's concern with customer loses due to reputation effects following its bankruptcy filing: "United Airlines has launched a national advertising campaign to reassure customers that it will keep flying following its bankruptcy-law filing,..." "The all-text, blackand-white ads assure customers that United, a unit of UAL, is honoring tickets and frequent-flier miles." 20 See the appendix for the presentation of a simple model that leads to these graphical representations of the reaction functions of the firms. 21 The reaction functions are represented as linear only for sake of simplicity.
the same service. The empirical framework described in Section (5.2) takes the model represented in Figure 1 , and its predictions, to the data. This definition of market is consistent with the analysis of demand in Borenstein (1991) . The dataset includes a sample of markets between the top 50 MSAs, ranked by the population size. 23 Data on ticket prices are from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is discussed in the Appendix.
We identify 12 national carriers operating at some point during the our sample window: American, Continental, Delta, America West (until the third quarter of 2005), Northwest, TWA (until the second quarter of 2001), United, USAir, Southwest, Markair, ATA, National. We combine all 22 See also Khanna and Tice (2005) for a study of how firms might strategically lower prices during recessions to force exit of efficient, financially constrained rivals. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) for a study on how leveraged buyouts impact plant closing decisions. 23 To construct the sample, we take all the markets between the top 50 MSAs, and then we draw a 10 percent sample of them. For each one of these markets we include any year-quarter observation that is in the original dataset. We consider a smaller sample to alleviate the computational burden in the structural analysis.
the remaining low cost carriers in one group, which we call the LCC type (e.g., the LCC category includes Jet Blue and Frontier). For each market-year-quarter, we take the averages across the low cost carriers for the variables of interest. This allows us to keep small carriers that are present in only a few markets. Further, it allows us to use a meaningful grouping capturing the impact of small carrier presence in the market. We exclude Markair, ATA, and National from the LCC type to study the effect of their bankruptcies.
There are 52, 394 market-carrier-year-quarter specific observations. In the following, markets are indexed by m = 1, ..., M and year-quarter combinations by t = 1, ...T . Airport-to-airport routes are denoted by r = 1, ..., R mt . The subindex j = 1, ..., J mt denotes an airline in market m at time t. A single product is then denoted by a combination jrmt, which indicates that airline j (e.g. Bankrupt Carriers. In our sample period, the carriers that filed for bankruptcy protection at
BF (2 nd ), HP, CO. Notice that TWA filed for Chapter 11 three times, USAir and Markair filed twice. We will investigate the effect on prices for each one of these filings. 24 Table 2 provides summary statistics for these categorical variables. Using Table 1 , we build a series of categorical variables, illustrated in Table 3 , to indicate whether one of the firms in the industry is operating under Chapter 11 protection. For example, KisBkt mt is a categorical variable equal to 1 if carrier K serving market m is under bankruptcy protection at time t. Otherwise, KisBkt mt is equal to zero. The subscript m indicates whether firm K is an active participant in market m. If K is not in the market, then KisBkt mt = 0.
Itinerary Fare
We follow Borenstein (1989) and Ciliberto and Williams (2007) , and summarize the airline pricing behavior using the median, the 25th, and the 75th percentiles of the fares. 25 By doing so, we use some information on the distribution of prices available from the DB1B dataset while using as few statistics as possible. 26 The difference between the 75th percentile of the fares (189.88 dollars) and 24 The second time that Markair filed for Chapter 11, Markair filed for Chapter 7 after two quarters under Chapter 11.
25 The Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) provides information on characteristics of the trip, such as whether the ticket is for round-trip travel or whether the ticket is for a direct flight. The dataset does not provide ticket characteristics (e.g. refundable or not), or characteristics of the buyer. 26 Borenstein and Rose (1994) show that dispersion in the prices that an airline charges to different passengers in the same market is substantial and is consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness to switch to the median (137.68 dollars) is twice as large as the difference between the median and the 25th percentile of the fares (107.56 dollars), suggesting that there is much more dispersion at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. The variable P jrmt denotes the fare charged by an airline.
Exogenous Variables
Average Cost per Seat Mile. The economic marginal cost, which would be the relevant cost information, is not observable. 27 Still, it is reasonable that the economic marginal cost of transporting one passenger is a function of the average cost to carry one passenger for one mile, a concept known in the airline industry as the average cost per seat mile. We construct the average cost per seat mile using the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses available from the Air Carrier In the structural analysis, we infer the economic marginal cost from the firms' pricing decisions under the assumption that airline firms play a non-cooperative static Nash-Bertrand game with differentiated products. This behavioral assumption is the same as in Bresnahan (1987) Measures of Product Differentiation. We include a measure of the network of an airline at an airport and is motivated by the work of Berry ( , 1992 and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) .
NetworkExtentOrigin jrmt is equal to the percentage of all markets served out of an airport by airline j. 29 . The variable NetworkExtentDest jrmt is defined similarly. Airlines also differentiate alternative airlines. 27 Notice that the economic and accounting costs of flying one passenger are very different. The accounting cost of flying one passenger is the cost of issuing a ticket, processing the passenger through the gate, providing in-flight food and beverages, and insurance and other liability expenses. This cost is very small relative to the fixed costs faced by an airline to fly a plane on a route. However, this definition of accounting cost does not include the net profit on the passenger that the airline could have made on another route using the same plane, pilots and flight attendants (Elzinga and Mills [forthcoming] ). In addition, it does not include the rental rate at which the airline could have leased the gate.
28 Aguirregabiria and Ho [2006] consider a dynamic model of the airline industry. In their model, demand and supply in each period are independent across time. The entry decision is the only choice that that enters in their model in a dynamic fashion. The only, important, difference with our model is that we do not model the entry decision. Thus, market structure is assumed to be exogenous in our model, exactly as in Bresnahan [1987] , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Nevo [2000 and 2001] , Petrin (2002) . 29 For example, in the second quarter of 2002, Northwest was serving 82.6 percent of the markets out of Minneapolis. The closest competitor of Northwest at Minneapolis was American, which was serving 43 percent of the markets. To the traveler interested in collecting frequent flyer miles, Northwest was clearly providing a more attractive service, ceteris paribus, than American at Minneapolis. It is difficult to assess the extent to which this measure of network service out of airports proxies the attractiveness of the airlines' frequent flyer programs, since it may also measure the extent to which an airline is the only provider out of an airport, or other services at the airport (food courts, the their product in terms of the shortness of the flight between two airports. The variable Direct jrmt measures the percentage of tickets for direct service out of the total tickets sold by j. 30 When airlines provide connecting service, they must decide how many miles the passenger must travel in addition to the nonstop distance between two airports. ExtraMiles jrmt is equal to the ratio of the flown distance over the nonstop distance in miles between two airports. 31 Finally, airlines differ in the prices that they charge for one-way and round-trip tickets. The variable RoundT rip jrmt measures the percentage of roundtrip tickets. 32 Institutional characteristics of the airline industry ensure that these five variables are determined prior to the airlines' choice of prices. This is because prices can be changed at any time by an airline, while none of these variables can be changed in the same short period of time. Flight schedules, which involve crew scheduling and aircraft assignments, are developed a year prior to departure and updated every three months. 33 We will maintain that these five variables are exogenous in the demand and supply equations, and in the reduced form equation as well.
In some specifications, we also include other variables that explain variation in prices, such as the nonstop market distance and whether the destination airport is in either California, Florida, or Nevada (these are mostly tourist destinations). We also include the average temperatures at the origin and destination airports in February, May, July, and October. 34 Finally, we include the average precipitation at the origin in the same months, and the difference with the average precipitation at the destination airport. 35 
Econometric Model
First, we provide a reduced form price regression and then a structural model of supply and demand in the airline industry. Our model of supply and demand could be solved to yield a reduced form, but the resulting regression equation would have a complex non-linear form. Instead, we propose linear versions of the reduced form pricing equation. Consequently, the parameters in the reduced form equations are not related to the coefficients in the supply and demand model that we present below in an obvious way.
number of ticket counters, etc). See Lederman [forthcoming] for an analysis of the effect of FFPs on airlines' demand. 30 If an airline provides both direct and connecting service, Direct jrmt is a fraction between 0 and 1. 31 Thus, a direct flight will be associated with a value of ExtraMilesjrmt equal to 1, while connecting flights will be associated with values larger than 1. Clearly, the larger the number of extra miles that a passenger must travel between two airports, the less attractive is to travel on a connecting trip than on a nonstop trip. 32 Most of the major airlines sell round-trip tickets at a considerable discount relative to buying two one-way tickets. Other airlines, such as Southwest, do not make such a difference. 33 For more on this, see Ramdas and Williams [2007] , and references therein. 34 The data are from the site weather.com. They were collected in April 2005. 35 Summary statistics for variables that are used in the analysis, for example the average temperature at the origin MSA, but are not shown in Table 2 are available from the authors.
Reduced Form Analysis
First, we test the hypothesis that bankruptcy changes product market competition by studying the effect of a carrier's bankruptcy on the average price of tickets in the market where the carrier operates. Then, we study carrier specific responses to each of the bankruptcies in our sample.
Mean price effect, across markets and carriers
Using the notation introduced in Section (4.1), the first equation of interest is the following:
The precise definition of the variables in the above equation is given in Table 3 . Here, we present a brief discussion of what they measure. The coefficient a 1 of the variable KisBkt mt measures the effect that firm K's bankruptcy filing has on the prices of all firms in route r serving market m at time t. This is our main coefficient of interest for this specification. KisIn mt measures whether K's presence in a market affects the pricing behavior of all other carriers in that market, regardless of whether K is under Chapter 11 protection. X jmt is a matrix of variables that are exogenous market or carrier specific, time varying determinants of prices. u 1,jr , u 1,t , and u 1,jrmt are the error terms: u 1,jr is a market-carrier effect; u 1,t is a time effect; u 1,jrmt are routecarrier-year-quarter idiosyncratic unobservables. We will use fixed and random effects to estimate the route-carrier, year-quarter effects, and report the differences in the estimation specifications.
Notice that in equation (1) only one firm, K, is under bankruptcy protection. This is just for simplicity of exposition. The full blown equation (1), incorporates as many terms a 1 · KisBkt mt + b 1 · KisIn mt as bankrupt carriers there are.
Carrier-specific price response
The second reduced form specification investigates the effect of bankruptcy protection on the bankrupt carrier's own prices and on the competitors' prices in markets where the bankrupt carrier is actively competing:
, captures the effect of K's bankruptcy filing on K's prices; Recall from Section (4.1) that a product here is a carrier-airport-to-airport combination.
Consumers can also decide not to fly. The decision not to fly is modeled as equivalent to choosing an outside option, j = 0. A crucial role of the outside good is to make sure that if the prices of all airlines increase, the aggregate demand drops. The shares of the outside good and of the inside goods are a function of the potential demand for unidirectional air travel. We model the potential demand for unidirectional air travel equal to the population of age 21 to 65 years old of the origin city. 36 This definition is consistent with those used by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2000, 2001) , and Petrin (2002) . Notice that the inclusion of route-carrier specific effects addresses the possibility that markets and routes from the same city differ by some unobservable feature.
As before, let K denote a firm that files for bankruptcy protection at some point in time. We write the indirect utility that consumer i receives from purchasing airline product j in market m at time t as:
Here, X D jrmt is the subset of X jrmt , first defined in Section (5.1), that determines the demand of airline travel. BktOwn K jmt is defined as in Section (5.1.2), and φ K measures the effect that K's filing for Chapter 11 has on the utility that consumers derive from flying on carrier K. The demand for travel on all airlines is affected when carrier K files for Chapter 11 because the choice of flying is made comparing all airlines. 37 Next, we model the error term2 ijrmt as follows:
36 The total size of the population is from the Regional Economic Accounts (Local Area Personal Income). The fraction of individuals that are of age 21 to 65 years old is from the Current Population Survey. 37 Formally, consumer i flies on the bankrupt firm K instead of airline j if:
Here, ² ijrmt is an identically and independently distributed extreme value. ζ igm is an unobserved variable common to all products in group g and has a distribution that depends on λ with 0 ≤ λ < 1. 38 The distribution of ζ igm is the unique distribution with the property that, if ² ijrmt is an extreme value random variable, then ζ igm + (1 − λ) ² ijrmt is also an extreme value random variable (see Berry (1994) ). We consider the case where there are two nests in each market: flying and not flying. Then, the λ parameter governs consumers' substitution patterns between flying and the outside option (not traveling, driving, ...). Higher values of λ imply that the consumer views products in different nests as poor substitutes.
ξ jr is a route-carrier specific unobservable; ξ t is a year-quarter specific unobservable. We control for these unobservables using fixed effects, exactly as in the reduced form regression. Finally, ξ jrmt is a route-carrier-year-quarter unobservable. Firms and consumers observe this error and firms take it into account when they set their prices. Hence, prices are correlated with the errors and we need to introduce exclusion restrictions. We discuss the instruments in Section (6).
We aggregate across consumers to get the following expression for the demand and then rearrange to write:
where all the parameters of the consumers' utility function now enter the equation linearly (Berry (1994) ). Here, s jrmt and s Krmt represent product j 0 s and K 0 s market shares, s 0mt , the share of the outside good, s jrmt|g the group share of product j. We have normalized the value of the outside option to: u 0mt = ζ 0mt + (1 − λ)² i0mt . Equation (5) provides the first set of equations that enter our system of demand and pricing equations.
Pricing Equation
The pricing equation is derived from the first order condition of the carrier's profit maximization problem for all its products sold in market m at time t. Following Nevo (2000), and omitting the bankruptcy terms for sake of brevity, these carrier's first order conditions for profit maximization can be derived as follows. First write the profit function of an airline j in market m as (fixed costs and market size are omitted for simplicity):
where F jmt is the sets of routes served by firm j in market m at time t. Recall that C mt is the set of all possible choices for the consumers. Then, F jmt ⊆ C mt . Further, p jlmt , mc jlmt , and s jlmt are 38 In the empirical implementation we do not restrict λ to be included between 0 and 1. We do estimate it to be between those two values. firm j's fare, marginal cost and market share in route l, market m at time t, respectively.
The first order conditions for the price of a ticket on route r served by product firm j satisfies
∂s jlmt ∂p jrmt = 0. Using vector notation this simplifies to,
where the matrix Ω mt is the matrix of cross and own price elasticities after we replace those entries which correspond to routes served by different carriers with zeros. Thus, an entry in the matrix Ω mt is defined as,
Because we estimate the demand for airline travel, we can estimate the matrix Ω mt . We can invert the matrix, Ω mt , to solve for the equilibrium price vector, p mt , in equation (6) to yield the pricing equation we will estimate,
The marginal cost of each product r served by firm j as follows:
where ASM Cost jt is the accounting average cost per seat mile that we defined in Section (4.3) and w jrmt are observed factors impacting the pricing decisions of airlines, and include controls such as NetworkExtentOrigin and N etworkExtentDest. 39 Note that w jrmt does not include time invariant route-carrier characteristics, since we include route-carrier fixed effects Now, given the vectors Ω mt and mc mt , and including the bankruptcy terms, the pricing function we estimate is,
Here, α OW N , α LAR , α W N , and α LCC are parameters measuring the supply side changes in pricing behavior that are not explained by changes in the markup of a firm ((Ω mt ) −1 s mt ), or in its marginal cost (mc mt ), for large national carriers, Southwest Airlines, and low cost carriers, respectively.ω mt is the vector of unobservables that determine the pricing decisions of the firm. A cell inω mt is 39 The variables N etworkExtentOriginjmt and N etworkExtentDestjmt enter into the first order condition as part of w jmt . The larger the network, the more likely the presence of economies of densities at an airport (Brueckner and Spiller (1994)). However, as Borenstein (1989) clearly pointed out, firms might use the extent of their network at an airport to leverage the consumers' loyalty and charge higher prices. As above, the parameters associated with these two variables capture the net effect of these two opposite forces. modeled as,ω jrmt = ω jr + ω t + ω jrmt ,where ω jr are route carrier specific unobservables and ω t are year-quarter specific unobservables. We control for these two unobservables with the corresponding fixed effects. The unobservable ω jrmt is route-carrier-year-quarter specific.
Estimation
Following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we estimate the parameters of our model using GMM. Estimating the two equations simultaneously allows us to take into account the cross-equation restrictions present in our model. The non-linear parameters in our model include the price coefficient in the consumer's utility function, φ and the term governing substitution patterns, λ. 40 The assumption of a nested logit model of demand implies that the disturbance terms in both the supply and demand equations, ω jrmt (Θ) and ξ jrmt (Θ) respectively, have an analytical solution as a function of the parameters and data as demonstrated above. 41 
Identification
There are four identification concerns that need to be addressed.
First, a firm's bankruptcy filing is a consequence of the firm's financial distress. And in turn, the firm's financial distress might impact the firm's pricing behavior. Thus, the firm's bankruptcy filing could potentially be a product of the firm's pricing strategy while in financial distress. As the firm's financial condition becomes increasingly dire, the firm might drop its prices to generate cash (Hendel (1996) ). Competitors might match the price drop, which in turn, worsen the distressed firm's financial condition. As a result, the distressed firm might file for bankruptcy protection sooner than it would have, had it not lowered prices in an attempt to generate cash. Such behavior by the distressed firm and its competitors might dim the estimated effect that bankruptcy has on prices, since prices would be changing before the actual bankruptcy filing. We propose a simple solution to address this concern: We drop market-carrier-year-quarter observations that are from 40 The small number of non-linear parameters allows one to get an excellent set of starting values for the GMM routine by first estimating demand and then the supply equation. 41 The moment conditions we will use in estimation are constructed by interacting these unobservables with sets of exogenous instruments (discussed in detail in the next section) as
These moment conditions are then used to construct an objective function to be minimized, implying that our final estimator takes the form b Θ = arg min
where G * (Θ) = A(Θ)G(Θ), and A(Θ) 0 A(Θ) = W (Θ), the weighting matrix used in estimation. The weighting matrix used in estimation is a consistent estimate of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. The asymptotic distribution of our estimator is then
The standard errors reported use consistent estimates of both Γ and V . A consistent estimate of Γ is computed using numerical derivatives where necessary.
two quarters before a to-be-bankrupt firm's filing date and that are from markets where the tobe-bankrupt firm was present. 42 For example, since United filed for bankruptcy protection at the end of 2002, we drop from our dataset all the markets where United was present in the third and fourth quarter of 2002. We repeat this for all the bankruptcies in our sample. By dropping the quarters that immediately preceded the filing we can tease apart the pre-bankruptcy period, when the distressed firm might have taken desperate actions to avoid the bankruptcy filing, and the pre-bankruptcy period, during which bankruptcy was most likely unforeseeable.
Second, the presence of a carrier in a market might have some effect on the pricing behavior of other carriers in that market, regardless of the carrier's bankruptcy status. Thus, it is important to differentiate the effect on prices of a bankruptcy filing from the effect that just the presence of a firm in the market might have. To deal with this, we include the categorical variable KisIN mt , which switches on when firm K is in market m at time t. This variable, however, is likely a function of the same unobservables that affect the pricing decisions. 43 We use market-carrier fixed effects to control for the unobservables just described.
Third, prices and shares are endogenous in the demand equation. Following Bresnahan (1987) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we look at the first order conditions for price to gain intuition regarding appropriate instruments. Under the assumption maintained in the literature, that the location of products in characteristic space precedes the pricing decision, Bresnahan (1987) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) suggest that the closeness of competitors' products, measured in characteristic space, is an important and exogenous determinant of pricing behavior. 44
Examining the first order conditions for price, it is then clear that the NetworkExtentOrigin krmt , and N etworkExtentDest krmt of all the firms k 6 = j, present at the origin and destination are appropriate instruments for prices in the demand equation. Further examination of the first order conditions reveals a number of variables excluded from the demand system that also determine the pricing behavior of firms and consequently within group shares. These excluded variables include the vector of cost shifters, w jrmt summarized in Table 2 .
Finally, we include year-quarter fixed effects to control for demand changes spurring from seasonal, as well as exogenous, shocks (e.g. September 11, 2001 ) and for supply shocks (e.g. increases in the cost of fuel).
42 See footnote 2 in BR for another discussion on the endogeneity of bankruptcy filings. BR do not address the endogeneity of the filings in their analysis. The choice of two quarters is motivated by Table 5 in BR, which presents the change in prices 0-90 and 90-180 days before the filing.
43 For instance, a carrier flying on a certain time schedule might benefit business travel in some markets but not necessarily in others, thus affecting the price behavior of that carrier in those markets. It could also be the case that a carrier in a given market uses more modern planes than other carriers in that same market; this unobservable plane quality characteristic in a specific market can potentially affect the price that each carrier in that market can demand for its service.
44 See our discussion in Section (4.3) for more on this. Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the reduced form equation (1) filing. The average price reactions in response to these bankruptcies are larger in magnitude. The third set of results concerns not-first-time filers. In response to US Airways's second bankruptcy filing, the median price dropped by 8.7 percent and in response to TWA's third filing the median price dropped 4.9 percent. If repeated filings reveal a more dire financial condition, the larger price response could reflect the carrier's frantic attempt to collect cash and avoid liquidation, while competitors are more aggressively trying to push these carriers into liquidation.
Reduced Form Results

Mean price effect across markets and carries
During our sample period, two carriers, National Airlines and Markair, filed for Chapter 11 and subsequently converted their filing into a Chapter 7 filing. Under this filing, the bankrupt firm must sell its assets and liquidate. While these carriers operated under Chapter 11 protection, the price response to their Chapter 11 filing is not significant. One explanation for this result is that both the bankrupt carrier, as well as its competitors, knew that filing under Chapter 11 protection was a hopeless attempt by the bankrupt carrier to remain in business; thus the bankrupt carrier did not pursue a more aggressive pricing behavior, and the competitors were not compelled to follow suit, or to price more aggressively in an attempt to drive the distressed carrier to liquidate its assets.
Our sample periods begins with some carriers already operating under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. These carriers are Continental, America West, and TWA and Markair during their first filing. Thus, our estimates capture the average price reaction as these carriers prepare to emerge from bankruptcy protection. The estimates show that as Continental prepares to emerge from bankruptcy, average prices, across carriers in markets where Continental operates, drop by 7.9 percent. As America West's bankruptcy ends, average prices increase by 3 percent. There is no significant price reaction as Markair and TWA prepare to emerge. Two carriers filed for Chapter 11 protection towards the end of our sample period, Northwest and Delta Airlines. Thus for these carriers our estimates capture the early price reaction to Delta and Northwest's bankruptcy. In response to Delta and Northwest's filing, prices increase by 3.9 and 1.2 percent respectively. As will be shown below, this result is not robust to different specifications of equation (1).
The last bankruptcy we consider is a special case. It is TWA's second bankruptcy filing, which was a pre-packaged bankruptcy. This means that prior to filing for Court protection, TWA had a reorganization plan already approved by its creditors. Consequently, at the time of filing, the carrier and its competitor's were aware of TWA's business reorganization plan, and thus the filing in itself did not add to the carrier's strategic interactions. The coefficient estimate is economically insignificant.
Column 2 of Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients when the pre-bankruptcy window (two quarters before a to-be-bankrupt firm's filing date) is excluded from our sample. Controlling for the endogeneity of the bankruptcy filing, the estimated price reaction to each filing is at least as large in magnitude as the estimated price reaction when ignoring the potential endogeneity issue.
In the remaining of our analysis, we will keep dropping two quarters before a to-be-bankrupt firm's filing date. Column 5 shows that the effect of bankruptcy on prices is overestimated if year-quarter effects are ignored. In particular, the effect of the bankruptcies of United, US Airways, National, TWA's third filing, and America West are at least twice as large when time effects are ignored. Thus, Column 5 confirms that specific controls for unobservable year-quarter effects are needed to obtain unbiased estimates for KisBkt rmt in equation (1).
Columns 3 and 4 of
Carrier-specific price response
The estimates reported in Table 4 show the average price reaction to a carrier's bankruptcy filing without disentangling the own bankrupt carrier effect from the effect of competitors. In Table   5 we tease apart a carrier response to its own bankruptcy, from the response of its competitors.
These estimates correspond to the reduced form specification (2).
We identify whether the price reaction of the bankrupt carrier, and of competitors such as Southwest, large national carriers (such as American Airlines, Continental, and United), and low cost carriers (such as Jet Blue and Frontier) differ in significant ways. Southwest's reaction is not consistent within bankruptcies that share some common characteristic (such as bankruptcies that culminated in liquidation, bankruptcies for which our sample covers the beginning of the bankruptcy years or the end of the bankruptcy years).
Results reported in Column 4 reveal that low cost carriers either do not significantly react to a carrier's bankruptcy filing, or react lowering prices. The bankruptcies to which low cost carriers react are ATA, Continental, US Airway's second filing, and TWA's third filing, with an average price drop range from 5.6 percent in response to US Airways's bankruptcy, to 9.9 percent, in response to Continental's bankruptcy. Note that the low cost carrier's response is not limited to, and does not include all, the bankruptcies of other low cost carriers (such as National and Markair). We do not find any specific pattern as to the type of bankruptcies low cost carriers react to.
Structural Form Results
The results from the reduced form estimation indicate that, following a carrier's bankruptcy filing, ticket prices change. But that analysis could not explain whether the price changes are supply or demand driven. The purpose of this structural estimation is precisely to tease apart whether the price reaction to a bankruptcy filing is supply, demand, or supply and demand driven.
Demand Estimation
We estimate the demand function (5) using different assumptions on the error structure; different assumptions on the choices that consumers have when they travel; and different ticket prices (median, 25 th , and 75 th price). Coefficient estimates are reported in Table 6 .
Column 1 presents the main specification, where the demand is estimated jointly with the pricing equation (8) . This specification uses the median ticket price, and includes year-quarter fixed effects and route-carrier fixed effects. We find that filing for Chapter 11 decreases the demand of the bankrupt firm, with the only exception of the bankruptcy of America West and National
Airlines. These coefficients reveal a small economic impact on the demand of all airlines. We return to this in Section (8.3).
To check the robustness of our estimates, we explore three possible explanations for why bankruptcy might have a small effect on demand.
First, it is possible that the price distribution is skewed to the right in such a way that using the median price in equation (8) does not allow us to capture the true effect of bankruptcy on demand.
To address this possibility, Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 consider the effect of the bankruptcy filings on the demand when we use the 25 th and 75 th percentile price, respectively. Using these different points in the price distribution does not yield larger demand effects of bankruptcy. Further, comparing Columns 1 through 3 of Table 6 , reveals that the effect of bankruptcy on demand is not systematically different along the price distribution.
Second, we might be understating the size of market, and/or the demand for the outside good.
To address this possibility we eliminate from the model for demand the outside good. 46 This requires that we redefine what a market is. Instead of defining a market as all the population of age 21 to 65 years old in the origin city, we consider the extreme case where the market size is equal to the total number of travelers in a market in a year-quarter. Under this assumption, the demand function we estimate is,
where j and l are two airlines in a market. In each market-year-quarter we choose a "base" airline, l, to which we compare all the other airlines. 47 The estimates are reported in Column 4. As is well known, this specification forces consumers to choose among the inside goods and demand only depends on differences in prices; thus a general increase in prices will not decrease aggregate output (Berry (1994) ). Consequently, the coefficient on prices, µ, is underestimated (µ = −0.815
in Column 1 and drops to µ = −0.771 in Column 4) and the demand is estimated to be less elastic than it actually is. For our purpose, underestimating the elasticity is not a serious concern since our main objective is to estimate the effect of bankruptcy, φ K . These are largely similar in Columns 1 and 4, suggesting that the definition of the market is not driving our results. 48
The estimates of the control variables reported in Table 6 are all intuitive. The coefficient on price suggests that the demand for airline travel is more elastic at the bottom end of the distribution (the coefficient is equal to −1.457 in Column 2), than at the median (−0.815), and at the top of the distribution (−0.459). Second, an estimate of λ significantly different from zero implies that there is correlation in the unobservable portion of consumers' utility for products in the same group.
In the context of our model of demand with only two nests, g ∈ {airtravel or outside option}, consumers do not view other forms of travel, or the option of not traveling, as a good substitute for air travel and vice-versa. 49 46 We also considered other definition of market size. For example, we used information from the data from the Omnibus Household Survey, August 2003, which reports that about one out of every three adult US residents flew at least once on a commercial airline during the 12 months prior to the survey, to define a smaller market size. However, the results were almost identical.
47 Clearly, monopoly markets had to be dropped from the analysis. In addition, in each market-year-quarter, we had to drop observations from the base airline l. 48 In fact, 86.1 percentage of the 5.5 percentage change consisted of demand shifting to the outside good (driving a car or not traveling). The remaining 0.76 percent (0.76 = (1 − 0.861) * 5.5%) change in United's demand corresponds to consumers substituting United with United's competitors.
49 Discussion on the estimation results for the other control variables is omitted for sake of brevity. It is available from the authors. Table 7 presents the estimation results of equation (8) . The dependent variable is the median fare divided by 100. Table 7 reports the results of one specification and uses different columns to present the effect that each of the bankruptcy filings has on relevant competitors. 50
Estimation of the Pricing Equation
Column 1 reports the bankrupt firm's price reaction to its bankruptcy, after we control for changes in the bankrupt carrier's marginal cost and demand-driven markup. The results are consistent throughout all carriers, but America West and the recent filings, Delta and Northwest.
Excluding the latter, all other carrier's respond to their bankruptcy significantly lowering prices.
For instance, United Airlines responded to its bankruptcy filing lowering prices by $8.17. We compute that for United the $8.17 price drop is equivalent to a 5.79 percentage price drop. 51 This effect is close to the 5.1 percent price drop reported in the reduced form results in Table 6 . The closeness of the reduced form results and the pricing equation estimates is not unique to United's bankruptcy. For instance, for US Airway's first filing, the price equation estimates report that the bankrupt carrier lowered its price by $7.24. When we translate this to an average price change we find a 5.4 percentage price change, which is near the 7.2 percentage change reported in the reduced form results in Table 6 .
Column 2 through 4 report the price reactions for Southwest, other large national carriers, and low cost carriers respectively. Column 2 shows that Southwest's behavior is again at odds with that of other carriers. The parameter estimate for Southwest's response to the bankruptcies of United, US Air first filing, TWA's third filing, National Airlines, Delta, and Northwest is consistently positive and significant. This means that Southwest raises its prices beyond what would be explained by changes in its marginal cost and by demand driven changes to its markup. For example, Southwest increased its price by $21.21 in response to United's Chapter 11 filing, and $17.55 in response to US Airway's first filing. Column 3 shows that the price reaction of large national carriers is consistent with the own bankrupt carrier's response. Column 4 shows similar results for the low costs carrier's price response.
Demand versus Supply Explanation
We now determine whether the price changes uncovered by the reduced form analysis are mainly demand or supply driven. To do this, we prepared Table 8 . 50 Note that because in the reduced forms the dependent variable was the log (fare), the coefficient of the bankruptices could be itnerepreted as percentrage changes. Here, however, the coefficients are price changes, not percentage changes. Therefore, to compare the results in Table 6 with those in Table7 we first need to divide the coefficient estimates by the average price of an airline in each route and then take the average across all routes.
51 To compare this result with the drop in price reported in the reduced form estimation in Table 6 , we must convert this nominal price change into its percentage equivalent. We do this by first computing the mean price charged by a carrier in a market. Then, we take the ratio of the estimated coefficients over this mean price. Then, we take the mean of the ratios across all markets where the carrier is present. To compute the price that would prevail if bankruptcy only affected supply, we follow these three steps. First, we choose the market-year-quarter observations when the carried under consideration is bankrupt. Next, for the selected time window, we calculate the average price, across markets, for each carrier. Third, we set to zero the relevant bankruptcy dummies in the demand equation and leave the bankruptcy dummies in the supply equation equal to 1. Using this data construct, we recompute the equilibrium price.
To compute the price that would have prevailed if the carrier did not file for bankruptcy, we follow a similar strategy. We identify the time window when the carrier under consideration is operating in bankruptcy and set, for this time frame, the bankruptcy dummies in the demand and in the price equation to zero. We then recompute the equilibrium price using this data construct.
The results show that for the bankrupt carrier, the observed prices during bankruptcy are lower than those that would have prevailed had the carrier not filed for bankruptcy. For instance, had To the best of our knowledge, no research has been done on the extent to which consumers benefit from the existence of Chapter 11. This is the purpose of this Section. In particular, we ask whether consumers would have been better off if Chapter 11 had not been available to firms and if the firms had to liquidate their assets and shutdown.
This counter-factual exercise consists of computing the equilibrium prices, market shares, and change in consumer welfare that would have prevailed if the bankrupt firm had to liquidate its assets. To do this, we focus on the bankruptcies of United, USAir, and ATA. We further restrict our anaylsis to year-quarters observations after the bankrupt firm emerged from Chapter 11. We exclude the bankrupt airline from this restricted sample and use the demand and pricing parameter estimates reported in Sections (8.1) and (8.2) to recompute the the equilibrium prices, shares, and consumer welfare.
For each of these bankruptcies, we calculate the average change in prices and market shares for all firms and, separately, for Southwest.
The top panel of Column 1 of Table 9 reports that, if United had been liquidated instead of allowed to operate under Chapter 11 protection, average prices would have been 0.9 percent higher and market shares 0.5 percent lower. The findings for Southwest are analogous. Overall, consumers would lose if United could not file for Chapter 11 protection, but the change in welfare would have been quite marginal, as we measure it to be, on average, equal to −3, 409 dollars in a quarter in a market. Clearly, the change in consumer welfare would have been negative because on average the prices increased. Thus, in the case of United's bankruptcy, the carrier's ability to operate under Chapter 11 protection affected consumer welfare only marginally. Columns 2 and Column 1. the case of ATA's bankruptcy is reported in Column 4. We observe that prices would have been higher and market shares lower if ATA had to liquidate its assets and shutdown. Most importantly, consumer welfare would have been significantly lower if ATA had liquidated.
The results reported in Table 9 reveal that consumer welfare would drop significantly and in a consistent fashion if Chapter 11 were unavailable only in the case of ATA's bankruptcy. In the other three bankruptcies considered, consumer welfare, prices, and shares would be essentially unchanged if a to-be-bankrupt firm had to liquidate its assets instead of being given the possibility to reorganize itself.
We interpret this result as evidence that Chapter 11 plays a crucial role in protecting consumers only when the to-be-bankrupt firm is a low cost carrier, such as ATA. The loss of a low-cost carrier drives up the equilibrium prices charged by all firms in a market, and results in a lower consumer welfare. Now, let's return to the Introduction. There, we wrote that in the long run we would expect entry in the markets from which the bankrupt firm exited. It turns out that our main conclusion that Chapter 11 did not benefit consumers in the United and USAir bankruptcies is actually reinforced by the short-run nature of our exercise. To see why, notice that if new firms were to enter into markets, we would expect prices to drop and consumer welfare to increase. But we see that prices would have been largely unchanged even in the event of no new entries. If anything, allowing for new entry would possibly lead to conclude that Chapter 11 was not beneficial even in the ATA bankruptcy filing.
Conclusions
This paper empirically examines whether a firm's bankruptcy filing affects product market competition, using evidence from the US airline industry. Detailed institutional analysis reveals that a bankruptcy filing spawns real shocks to the supply and demand of the bankrupt firm and its competitors. Thus, we first investigate whether a firm's bankruptcy filing affects product market prices, and second, we disentangle whether the price effect is demand or supply driven.
We find that, in response to a carrier's bankruptcy filing, prices significantly drop in the markets where the bankrupt carrier is an active competitor. To identify whether these price changes are supply or demand driven, we present a structural model of the airline industry, where we estimate a model of the demand for air travel and a model of airline pricing behavior. Our estimates show that most of the price change is driven by the carrier's pricing behavior. In fact, we do not find any evidence that consumers substitute away from the bankrupt carrier to its competitors, instead, we find that consumers shift to the "no flying" option. Though our structural analysis allows us to identify that most of the price reaction to a carrier's bankruptcy filing is generated by the firm's shift in pricing equation, we are not able to identify what exactly in their pricing behavior changes. This is, our estimates of the price function includes categorical variables for each bankruptcy, and we observe that when these variables switch on, the firm's price strategy changes. What is driving the changes picked up by these categorical variables is best left for future research.
Finally, we present a counter-factual experiment, studying how prices and consumer welfare would have changed if firms had to liquidate their assets and exit the industry. We show that consumers do not benefit significantly from the availability of Chapter 11 to United or USAir (during its first bankruptcy); but that consumers benefit substantially from ATA's possibility to reorganize under Chapter 11. This counterfactual analysis is focused on consumer welfare, and thus leaves aside other consequences inherent to ignoring Chapter 11. For example, our analysis does not consider losses that passengers would face if reorganization was not an option and passengers where to loose frequent flyer miles; nor does it consider loses that cities and workers would face if a carrier in bankruptcy had to liquidate forcing widespread layoffs.
We started off wondering whether there is a real linkeage between a firm's bankruptcy filing, and the product market competitive interaction of firms in the industry. Our analysis shows that indeed, a firm's bankruptcy filing spurs real shochs in the industry that ultimately affect competition in the bankrupt firm's product market. We find that during bankruptcy, both the bankrupt firm and its competitor to lower prices. We also find that the main channel through which a firm's bankruptcy impacts prices is the pricing behavior of firms in the bankrupt firm's market. Bankruptcy thus appears to have negligible consequences on consumer's demand for air travel.
Appendix
A Simple Model
Each one of the two firms faces the profit function
, where −j is the subscript associated with the competing firm. p j is the price set by firm j and p −j is the price set by its competitor.
52 D j (p j , p −j ) indicates the quantity of the good that firm j must sell when it sets the price p j and its competitor sets the price p −j . c j denotes the constant marginal cost of the firm j.
At an interior Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the first order condition for firm j is given as
We assume the following:
We can then use the implicit function theorem to find the slope of the reaction function,
52 Fixed costs are omitted since we do not estimate them.
The denominator is negative, and thus the sign of dR j (p −j ) dp −j depends on
is negative depends on the sign of
≥ 0, p * j increases in p −j and we then say that products j and −j are strategic complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos, Klemperer (1985] ). This is the case, for example, with the usual textbook linear demands. It is also the case with the logit demand functions that we use below. In the paper, we have maintained that
≥ 0, thus j and −j are strategic complements.
The first order condition implicitly defines a reaction function p * j = R j (p −j ). We can apply the Implicit Function Theorem to find dp *
. Under the assumptions on the demand, dp * j dc j > 0.
Data Construction
Fare and passenger information are from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10 percent Following Borenstein (1989) , the mean, median, 25th percentile, and 75 percentile fares are from the distribution of fares weighted by the number of passengers paying each fare, not from a distribution that gives equal weight to each fare listed by the airline.
One important issue is how to treat regional airlines that operate through code-sharing agreements with national airlines. As long as the regional airline sells tickets independently, we treat it separately from the national airline. 53 The D1B1 dataset provides information on the "operating" and "ticketing"
carrier, which might differ in the case of code share agreements. In their institutional analysis of airline alliances, Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2003) discuss how code-share agreements allow a carrier to independently set price and sell service between cities that it otherwise would not be able to serve. Code share agreements can involve different financial agreements between the operating carrier and its alliance partner. In some alliances ("free sale" agreement), the operating carrier determines seat availability and the ticketing carrier sets prices for its service. In other alliances ("blocked space" agreement), the ticketing carrier buys a block of seats on each code-share flight from the operating carrier. Since fares are set by the ticketing carrier in both cases, we use the ticketing carrier to assign a ticket to a specific airline. Notice that this approach addresses the issue of how to treat regional carriers that operate for major airlines.
Another issue is that there are airlines that transport very few passengers in a quarter. In particular,
consider an airline using a small plane that has 20 seats to serve a regional market. One flight per week over a quarter tells us that the airline will transport 240 passengers at full capacity. A 10 percent sample should give the airline reporting 24 passengers in the dataset. If an airline reports less than 20 passengers in a quarter, we assume that the airline does not have an active presence in this market. Berry (1992) drops airlines which report less than 90 passengers in a quarter. We relax this condition to account for the progressive adoption of smaller regional jets by the US airlines.
Finally, we code a round-trip ticket as one directional trip ticket, which costs half the full round-trip ticket fare. This avoids overcounting the lower fares associated with round-trip tickets relative to the higher fares associated with purchasing two one-way tickets. In this way, it is possible to make the comparisons between one-way and round-trip fares meaningful, by comparing what two passengers would pay for traveling the same distance. Each passenger is only counted once when constructing the market and airport market shares. 
p j p j A shock to j 's cost function would only shift the A shock to the cost and demand functions of j would, reaction function of firm j . As a result, both firms and/or a shock to -j 's pricing equation would shift would charge lower prices in the new equilibrium.
the reaction functions of both firms. Firm j 's reaction function would contract and move to the left, while firm -j 's reaction function would expand, also moving to the left. As a result, the price charged by firm i would be lower at the new equilibrium. The price charged by firm -i could be higher. Standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each specification further includes a categorical variable to indicate whether the flight is direct, and one to indicate whether it is a roundtrip. Other included variables are: the log of the average cost per seat mile (the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses over the quarterly total of the product of the number of seats transported and of the number of miles flown by the airline), the number of extra miles flown (the ratio of the flown distance over the nonstop distance in miles between two airports, for a direct flight it is 1, while for connecting flights it is larger than 1); a measure of the carrier's network at origin and at destination, equal to the percentage of all markets served by the carrier from the origin and destination airport respectively; and a constant term Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Each specification includes a categorical variable to indicate whether the flight is direct, and one to indicate whether it is a roundtrip. Other included variables are: the log of the average cost per seat mile (the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses over the quarterly total of the product of the number of seats transported and of the number of miles flown by the airline), the number of extra miles flown (the ratio of the flown distance over the nonstop distance in miles between two airports, for a direct flight it is 1, while for connecting flights it is larger than 1); a measure of the carrier's network at origin and at destination, equal to the percentage of all markets served by the carrier from the origin and destination airport respectively; and a constant term. All columns include marketcarrier, and year-quarter fixed effects. All columns exclude the two quarters prior a carrier's bankruptcy filing. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Each specification includes a categorical variable to indicate whether the flight is direct, and one to indicate whether it is a roundtrip. Other included variables are: the log of the average cost per seat mile (the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses over the quarterly total of the product of the number of seats transported and of the number of miles flown by the airline), the number of extra miles flown (the ratio of the flown distance over the nonstop distance in miles between two airports, for a direct flight it is 1, while for connecting flights it is larger than 1); a measure of the carrier's network at origin and at destination, equal to the percentage of all markets served by the carrier from the origin and destination airport respectively; and a constant term. LCC are parameters measuring the supply side changes in pricing behavior that are not explained by changes in the markup of a firm, or in its marginal cost for large national carriers, Southwest Airlines, and low cost carriers, respectively; Ω mt is a matrix obtained by taking the matrix of cross and own price elasticities and replacing zeros for those entries which correspond to routes served by different carriers; mc mt is the vector of estimated marginal cost for each carrier; s mt is a vector of carrier's market shares in markets m at time t, and ω mt is the vector of unobservables determine the pricing decisions of the firm. A cell in ω mt is modeled as, ω jrmt = υ jr + υ t + υ jrmt The dependent variable is the median price divided by 100. We report one specification and use different columns to present the effect that each of the bankruptcy filings has on relevant competitors. Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10% The observed price when the carrier is bankrupt is the mean price across in these quarters, across markets. To determine the prices we would observe if bankruptcy only affected supply side, we set the relevant bankruptcy dummies in the demand equation we estimate equal to zero, while leaving the bankruptcy dummies in the supply equation we estimate equal to 1; and recomputed the equilibrium price. The price reported in the second row of prices is precisely this new equilibrium price. To determine the prices we would observe had the carrier not filed form Chapter 11 protection, we set the relevant bankruptcy dummies in the demand and in the price equation we estimate equal to zero and recomputed the equilibrium price. The price reported in the third row of prices is precisely this new equilibrium price. This table presents a counter-factual exercise which consists of computing the equilibrium prices, market shares, and then the change in consumer welfare that we would have observed if the bankrupt firm had to liquidate its assets. Using the parameter estimates from the demand function reported in Table 6 , and the price function reported in Table 7 , we recomputed equilibrium prices, market shares, and consumer welfare excluding the bankrupt airline from the sample. We focus on the United, the USAir, and ATA bankruptcies, and for each of them, we report the average change in prices and market shares for all firms and, separately, for Southwest only. We find that consumer welfare would only drop significantly and in a consistent fashion if Chapter 11 were unavailable in the case of the ATA bankruptcy. In the other three bankruptcies, consumer welfare, prices, and shares would be essentially unchanged if a to-be-bankrupt firm had to liquidate its assets instead of being given the possibility to reorganize itself. 
